The success of the ''primary care case management (PCCM)'' form of managed care implemented in many state Medicaid programs over the past several years depends in part on the expanded availability of primary care physician sites to substitute for hospital-based outpatient care and to provide a medical home for enrollees. However, the PCCM requirement for physicians to accept assignment of a caseload of patients and to provide all of their primary care likely conflicts with the approach of limited Medicaid participation favored by many Medicaid physician participants. This study examines the early impact of PCCM implementation, in the absence of physician reimbursement level increases, on the patterns of Medicaid participation by physicians in communities in Georgia and Alabama. We find that the implementation of PCCM under these conditions often was associated with reductions in the proportion of physicians participating in Medicaid, reductions in the number of very small Medicaid practices, and declines in Medicaid visit volumes across all participating physicians. We also find evidence of an overall reduction in the number of primary care visits per Medicaid enrollee, but an increase in the proportion of these visits that were for preventive care services associated with initial PCCM implementation.
Attracting and retaining office-based primary care physicians in the Medicaid program is paramount to the success of continued efforts to provide access to care for children through the expansion of health insurance coverage. Yet, securing more than very minimal Medicaid participation by office-based primary care physicians has been difficult in many communities (Lewis-Idema 1992; Davidson 1993) . This is because office practices tend to be located in neighborhoods that are separate from the residential location of lowincome families (Fossett and Peterson 1989) , and because these practices have a limited capacity to provide care that is reimbursed at a fraction of prevailing fees (Sloan, Mitchell and Cromwell 1978; Mitchell 1991) .
In an effort to improve access and contain costs, many states began to move portions of their Medicaid population into a combination of fullrisk capitated managed care programs and more loosely organized primary care case management (PCCM) programs during the 1990s. The latter form of managed care continues to pay providers on a fee-for-service (FFS) basis, but assigns Medicaid beneficiaries to gatekeeper providers who must make specific referrals for specialty, emergency, and inpatient care. PCCM programs generally are designed to increase beneficiaries' use of primary and preventive care in physician offices, and decrease the use of specialty and urgent care, particularly in hospital outpatient sites. This model for care has the potential for improving the timeliness, quality, continuity, and appropriateness of care, and for lowering overall costs (Hurley, Freund, and Paul 1993) . As of June 2000, the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS) reported that 56% of Medicaid beneficiaries were enrolled in some form of managed care, with one-quarter of these enrolled in PCCM.
While the success of PCCM programs depends in part on the expanded availability of primary care physician sites to substitute for other sources of care, the requirement that physicians accept assignment of a specified group of Medicaid enrollees and provide all of their care may interfere with plans that physicians have to limit the size of their Medicaid practice. To the extent that PCCM programs actually may alter physicians' plans to participate in Medicaid, the programs are likely to have a difficult time improving beneficiaries' access to care. Most of the published evaluations of PCCM programs have focused on changes in the type and quantity of enrollee service use, and/or changes in Medicaid expenditures for services rather than on the provider system.
This study takes advantage of the phase-in of PCCM by county in Georgia (1994 Georgia ( -1997 and in Alabama (1996 Alabama ( -1999 to examine its effect on several dimensions of Medicaid physician availability. Specifically, we examine at the community level the effect of PCCM on the portion of local physicians who provide a Medicaid site, the mix of very small versus larger Medicaidphysician office sites, and mean office visit volume among Medicaid-participating physician sites in the community. As general measures of changes in access to care, we also examine the impact of PCCM on the number of primary care and preventive office visits per Medicaid child.
This study is part of a larger project, co-funded by the Agency for Healthcare Research and Quality (AHRQ) and the David and Lucille Packard Foundation under the Children's Health Insurance Research Initiative (CHIRI), to examine the impact of features of children's health insurance programs on recipients and their communities. Georgia and Alabama were chosen for comparison as states with similar beneficiary populations (including a large portion of African-American and rural residents), similarly low penetration of private and public sector risk-based (i.e., capitated) managed care, but also for differences in Medicaid provider markets, in Medicaid fee levels relative to private sector payments, and in the organization of their State Children's Health Insurance Programs (SCHIP). Future analyses will test hypotheses concerning total utilization using child-based records, community-level analysis of market share, and the introduction of SCHIP on Medicaid provider supply.
Background

Earlier Work
Examination of physicians' participation in Medicaid generally follows the physician as firm model (Sloan, Mitchell, and Cromwell 1978; Held and Holahan 1985) . In this model, physicians' decisions to participate are a function of private and Medicaid demand, and relative fees. Physicians enter into the Medicaid market when the marginal revenue curve from private demand drops below the state's Medicaid reimbursement level. Several studies have confirmed the positive effect of relative Medicaid fees (Sloan, Mitchell and Cromwell 1978; Adams 1995; Cohen and Cunningham 1995; Hassan, Bronstein, and Johnson 1997) , although the magnitude of the price elasticity is often small.
An important strand in this literature relates to geographic variation in Medicaid demand. Following Held and Holahan (1985) , increases in Medicaid fees will increase physician participation/volume only in areas with excess demand unless costs of services in one locale are lowered for enrollees residing in other areas (e.g., lower transportation costs). Fossett and Peterson (1989) argue that areas of excess demand are created via systematic segregation of the poor/minorities into areas, such as inner cities, where office-based physicians do not locate practice sites and provider enrollee ratios are low. They further argue that economic theory does not recognize the costs of expanding capacity to serve Medicaid clientele.
Residential segregation means physicians cannot easily make marginal adjustments in Medicaid volume and may incur additional costs via relocation (into higher-cost urban areas) or loss of private clientele as they expand. Further, given relatively low Medicaid reimbursements, the minimum efficient scale of a Medicaid practice likely is larger than that of a practice with mostly privately insured patients; this helps create a strong incentive for physicians in competitive urban areas to either take very few or many Medicaid patients (Fossett and Peterson 1989) . Researchers have tested for differences in effects of fees in urban and residentially segregated areas (Adams 1995 (Adams , 2001 Mitchell 1991) , and results support these arguments to some extent.
Several studies have established that there are many small, or limited, Medicaid practices, and the distribution of Medicaid patient visits is highly skewed (Sloan, Mitchell and Cromwell 1978; Perloff et al. 1997; United Hospital Fund 1999) . A major concern about the PCCM model is that, because of the tendency to limit Medicaid practices and physicians' unwillingness to take all Medicaid patients who seek care (Perloff, Kletke and Fossett 1995) , office-based physicians perhaps will not be willing to commit to 24-hour availability for their assigned clientele. Under PCCM, they may continue to limit Medicaid patients or stop accepting them altogether. Many early PCCM programs were implemented with compromises, including fee increases, the inclusion of outpatient departments and other established sites as primary care providers, and less than vigorous enforcement of gate-keeping requirements in order to avoid disrupting existing Medicaid delivery systems (Hohlen et al. 1990; Hurley, Freund, and Paul 1993; Schoenman, Evans, and Schur 1997) . States implementing PCCM have been urged to carefully recruit and make attempts to retain physicians, and to maintain or increase physician reimbursement rates in order to avoid the loss of participating physicians (Smith, Des Jardins, and Peterson 2000; Norton and Zuckerman 2000) .
Policy Changes and Anticipated Impacts
The phase-in of PCCM by county in both Alabama and Georgia took place over four years. Georgia's phase-in occurred between 1994 and 1997; Alabama's phase-in occurred between 1996 and 1999. The introduction of PCCM was not accompanied by fee increases, but it did include a $3/month payment per child in each state.
In accepting this minimal fee, participating physicians were instructed in their provider manual that the overall intent of PCCM was to provide patients with a medical home, including around-the-clock office or telephone access, and also to contain costs by better coordination of essential primary care services. In each state, physicians also were instructed to refer enrollees for specialist and hospital services when needed; gatekeepers were told they had to provide an authorization number for these services to be paid. The overall mandate of PCCM and these specific instructions certainly could provide incentives for reduced utilization. Moreover, Georgia physicians were instructed explicitly to provide information to enrollees requiring nonemergency services about how to handle medical problems during nonoffice hours; this aspect of care actually might reduce visits that otherwise would be made to emergency rooms.
In addition, both Alabama and Georgia required primary care referrals for emergency department services in the post-PCCM period, although provisions were made to allow emergency department providers to override the need for primary care referrals under some circumstances. Historically, public health departments provided Medicaid-funded preventive care to children in both states. Under PCCM, Alabama required referrals from primary care providers for this service, while Georgia implemented a referral requirement in December 1996. However, blanket authorization could be given to public health providers in both states.
Thus the anticipated effects of PCCM on the Medicaid office physician component of the provider systems in these two states are:
u Reduced physician participation rates; u Reduced numbers of very small physician office practices; u Increased proportion of large physician office practices; and u Increased primary care volume at office sites.
Given the increased accountability and management requirements placed on primary care participating physicians, the lack of a general fee increase and the reduced demand for services of non-primary care physician specialties, we anticipate an overall decline in the participation rate of community physicians. Unless the case manage-ment fees are enough to cover the additional costs of coordinating care, it is likely that participating physicians with initially small Medicaid practices will drop out. Smaller practices usually have not achieved economies of scale, and additional costs make it unprofitable to serve Medicaid patients.
If small practices drop out and new ones do not replace them, the remaining market should be comprised of a greater proportion of large Medicaid practices and, indeed, visits may be more concentrated per participating physician. A moderating factor is the performance standards that the states set for the adequacy of provider PCCM networks. Assuring access to providers is part of the federal government's requirements for states receiving waivers from the provider choice requirements of the Medicaid program. Medicaid programs aim for a reasonable provider-to-enrollee ratio, with a particular emphasis on avoiding the placement of enrollees into practices with very high caseloads (PriceWaterhouseCoopers 2001). Both Alabama and Georgia set a limit of 1,200 on the maximum caseloads of primary care providers; in Alabama, the maximum was 1,600 if the practice had physician extenders (nurse practitioners and physician assistants). This state also set a minimum caseload of 25 across all sites.
Data and Methodology
Data
We used paid Medicaid claims data for children from birth to age 18 for the calendar years 1994 through 1997 in Georgia, and 1996 through 1999 in Alabama, to identify the number of physician sites providing care to Medicaid-covered children and the number of visits they provided. Our focus was on primary care services. We defined these as the Current Procedural Terminology (CPT4) codes for evaluation and management, preventive care services, and emergency department services, plus all claims with indicators for early, periodic screening, diagnosis, and treatment (EPSDT) services and all claims with diagnoses codes indicating well-child monitoring or contraceptive services (coding available upon request). The subset of these claims with well-child diagnoses or codes indicating well-child or EPSDT services constitute preventive care and were sometimes analyzed separately. The data represent paid claims in the pre/post periods; post-PCCM, they were claims paid either to the assigned gatekeeper or for services approved by the gatekeeper. One county in Alabama with capitated Medicaid managed care during the study period was omitted from the analysis.
To derive counts of participating providers, we used the provider number unique to a particular site (address), available on both states' Medicaid claims data. Rather than collapse across addresses, we used this provider-site ID number to count the availability of participating Medicaid office sites. Each provider site was characterized as a physician office, hospital, federally qualified health center (hereafter termed clinic), or health department, based on the provider type on the states' separate ''Provider File.'' We focus here on office-based physician sites. We found that Alabama participating physicians averaged 1.8 Medicaid sites per physician, while Georgia participating physicians averaged 1.25 sites. The higher number of sites in Alabama may reflect the greater number of physicians per capita in urban Alabama communities versus those in Georgia. This would lead to more competition for private patients and perhaps encourage physicians to go to multiple sites to serve Medicaid clientele. Alabama also had many more communities with clinics that provided participating physicians more alternative sites from which to bill.
To measure practice size, we counted the number of visits for a single beneficiary to a single provider site on a single day, and then summed across all beneficiaries using this provider site during the year. Visits that included claims from both physician and hospital providers were assigned the physician provider type. We distinguished between small and larger Medicaid practices following the American Medical Association (AMA) assumption that physicians are participating in Medicaid if 1% or more of their total revenue is Medicaid funded. The average annual visit counts for family physicians, pediatricians, and internists in 1995 in the Southeast was 6,128 (AMA 1998). We therefore assumed that physicians with more than 61 (1% of the Southeastern average) Medicaid visits in a year had larger Medicaid practices.
Applying this to the provider site and quarter level, sites in Georgia with more than 12 Medicaid patient visits per quarter, and sites in Alabama with more than nine, were counted as larger practices. While these may appear to be only marginal participants, recall that physicians tend to have more than one Medicaid site, and that some small practices may not reflect conscious decisions by physicians but rather suburban practices that are remote from Medicaid beneficiaries. As we examine the effect of PCCM on the number of small practices, however, we control for the percentage of Medicaid children in the community.
Once counted and categorized, the Medicaid participating provider sites were groupedinto communities or service/market areas recognizing that these are different from county boundaries. We defined these communities as clusters of zip codes that share a common post office delivery name since these zips are geographically contiguous and represent a widely identifiable, unique location. We further divided the two largest communities in these states, Birmingham and Atlanta, into four and five subareas, respectively, by examining how Medicaid participating physician sites were clustered geographically across the zip codes included in these cities. All provider zip codes were cross-checked for accuracy with the county location code on the Medicaid provider file. Measures then were taken for each of these communities for each quarter of the time period.
Five additional sources of data were used to derive independent variables and characterize the market areas: 1) the American Medical Association in Chicago; 2) Consolidated Analysis Centers, Inc., (CACI) in Arlington, Va.; 3) CareData (which has since been acquired by CACI); 4) In-terStudy; and 5) Medicaid enrollment data from each state. The AMA's Masterfile was used to derive counts of primary care physicians (internists, pediatricians, general, family practice, and obstetricians/gynecologists) at the zip-code level. The CACI data were extrapolated from the census data to the zip-code level; we used their measures of total population, percentage under age 18, percentage black, and median household income. The CACI estimate of the population under 18 was used in combination with the AMA counts of active primary care physicians to derive measures of primary care physician per child by zip code. CACI population and Medicaid enrollment data (by quarter) were combined to measure the percentage of Medicaid children in each zip code.
The independent variables were designed to reflect characteristics of the market area served by each community's participating providers. They first were measured at the zip-code level for each quarter where possible, and then each zip code was given a weight for each provider community, based on the relative number of Medicaid-covered children residing in the zip code who received care from providers in the community in the base year (1996 in Alabama, 1994 . This method follows a growing set of literature that recognizes the importance of patient flows in defining markets and also allows market areas to overlap (Baker 2001) .
We also used the AMA count of only officebased primary care physicians to derive the denominator for a dependent variable-a site/participation rate. This rate is different from rates usually presented in the literature which measure the percentage of individual physicians participating at any level in Medicaid, counting all sites only once. Our site/participation measure is the number of Medicaid primary care practice sites in each quarter divided by total office-based primary care practices within each market. This measure is more reflective of the access generated to enrollees as physicians split their Medicaid practice and travel to alternative clinics/settings in both rural and inner-urban areas.
We also note that the quantitative analysis presented here was accompanied by qualitative analysis of providers and families regarding the PCCM and SCHIP programs in each study state. These focus group discussions were completed and transcribed by Georgia Health Decisions, Inc. We use some of the results from the provider focus groups in our discussion section.
Finally, to calculate an index of Medicaid-toprivate sector fees we identified a set of CPT4 evaluation/management codes (99201-4; 99212-14) found with frequency (20 or more) in both Medicaid and CareData in every year and in broad geographic areas (3-digit zip clusters) used by CareData to define ''markets.'' We derived a Paasche weighted fee index 1 for this set of codes to measure each state's Medicaid reimbursement generosity in each year. The private payment level was set equal to the 80 th percentile of the billed rate in the CareData. The Medicaid payment level was set equal to the median reimbursement for each code in these same 3-digit zip-code areas.
Methods
Our analytic file contained 4,168 community/ quarter observations in Alabama, and 4,880 community/quarter observations in Georgia. Ours is a slightly mixed panel of communities since a handful of them had one or more quarters (out of the total 16) without a provider making a claim, and hence, those quarters fell out of the regression. The number of communities ever in the panel was 326 for Georgia and 261 for Alabama. We used four community-level dependent variables to measure changes in the office-based provider system: 1) site participation rate; 2) number of small sites; 3) percentage of large office sites; and 4) office site visit volume. Since our ultimate interest was in access resulting from these changes, we also measured, at the community level, changes in per child enrollee: 1) primary care visits with office plus non-office providers; 2) primary care visits with office-based physicians; 3) preventive care visits with office plus non-office providers; and 4) preventive care visits with office-based physicians. Medicaid enrollment in the zip codes in the community's market, weighted as described earlier, was used as the denominator for these measures.
We used two measures of the presence of PCCM in a community in a given quarter. The first was a continuous measure reflecting the (market weighted) proportion of the community's market area (zip codes) located in counties that were phased into PCCM by that quarter. We used this continuous measure in both Georgia and Alabama fixed-effects models. The fixed-effects model accounted for the community-specific characteristics that did not change over time; as noted, our sample included a total of 261 communities in Alabama and 326 in Georgia. Georgia's phase-in was less concentrated across the quarters in the study period, and this allowed us to use a second measure, a dichotomous indicator of whether the providers' community was in a county in which PCCM was in effect. This allowed us to test a ''differences-in-differences'' (D-in-D) model among communities over the pre/post PCCM phase-in. While there might be concern with systematic differences by time of initiation of PCCM, Georgia phased in at the same time large groups of contiguous counties (including both urban and rural) surrounding major metro areas; the Atlanta metro area was phased in about midway-in February 1996.
We tested both random and fixed-effects models. The Hausman test generally indicated that the fixed-effects model was the most appropriate, and we present fixed-effects models throughout. Following the earlier literature and finding that an urban dummy variable was significant in pooled data, we estimated separate models for urban and rural communities within each state. The urbanrural differentiation was based on whether the community was in a county designated as part of a Metropolitan Statistical Area (MSA).
Results
In Tables 1 through 4, we present mean values of the independent and dependent variables for the beginning and end of the study period in each state. The data in Table 1 show that across communities in Alabama there were declines in the number of Medicaid participating sites per total office-based physicians (i.e., participation rate), slight declines in the number of limited office providers in Medicaid, a decline in urban areas in the portion of large physician sites, and very small increases overall in volume of office site visits. This slight increase in overall visit volume actually was driven by a sizable increase in volume for larger practices. Concurrent with these changes in the provider system, Medicaid children in Alabama communities experienced an increasing rate of total primary care visits, with a stable visit rate to office-based providers. Preventive care visits, across all sites and in office settings, were stable.
As shown in Table 2 , changes in the provider system in Georgia were somewhat different. As in Alabama, there were declines in site participation rate in urban areas, but increases in rural areas of the state. Similar to urban areas in Alabama, there were declines in the portion of large physician office sites and increases in the number of small Medicaid physician sites. However, in contrast to Alabama, average office visit volume declined over the PCCM implementation period, both overall and in larger office practice sites in Georgia. Concurrent with these changes in the provider system, Medicaid children in Georgia communities experienced declines in primary care visits at all sites; declines were greater overall in urban areas, but greater for visits to officebased providers in rural areas. Finally, overall preventive care visit rates also declined, but preventive visits to office sites were stable.
Corresponding to these changes in the dependent variables, the data in Tables 3 and 4 show that the states differ in these underlying characteristics and in the patterns of change. These data indicate that market areas for Alabama provider communities had a higher percentage of children enrolled in Medicaid, and far more primary care physicians per child. Demographically, Alabama's urban community markets included fewer areas with black populations proportionately greater than the 75 th percentile for the state (''High black'') than Georgia's urban communities, although the demographic composition of the rural areas of the two states was similar. Market areas for Alabama Medicaid participating physicians had higher median incomes than those of Georgia physicians. 
Impact of Medicaid PCCM
In both states, the percentage of Medicaid children and physicians per child increased over the study period. The increase in percentage of children enrolled in Medicaid was far greater in Georgia than in Alabama communities, however. Another cross-state difference was the marked increase in the percentage of our study communities with a Medicaid-participating clinic in Alabama versus Georgia. This percentage more than doubled in urban communities, and increased by over 50% in rural Alabama communities compared to increases of four to six percentage points in Georgia. Finally, while the relative generosity of Medicaid fees in Georgia started out higher than those in Alabama, they were actually lower by the end of the study period.
The changes seen in physicians' Medicaid participation patterns shown in Tables 1 and 2 could be due to these changes in overall provider supply, payment levels, Medicaid demand, and/or other factors. The analysis that follows tests whether these changes were associated with the phase-in of PCCM in the two study states.
Continuous PCCM Measure
Alabama. The results of the multivariate analysis based on a continuous measure of PCCM for Alabama communities are shown in Table 5 . These results indicate that the introduction of PCCM had a negative effect on at least the office-based sector of the Medicaid provider system in that state. In both urban and rural areas, Medicaid participation of all office-based sites was negatively associated with the phase-in of PCCM. The absolute number of small office physician sites was not affected in urban or rural areas. While we expected a decline in the number of these smaller sites and a corresponding increase in the percentage of larger sites, the results (Table 5 ) also show a decline in the proportion of sites that were above our threshold for large providers, as well as a decline in the office-based visit volume. Both were significantly associated with increases in the proportion of children in the PCCM program in the provider communities' market areas.
We were also interested in the effect of PCCM implementation on children's utilization. If the lower participation rate reduced access, PCCM could lead to lower use of primary/preventive care. It could be, however, that non-physician or safety-net providers in these communities compensated for declines in the office-based sector. The results in Table 6 show the estimated effects of PCCM on primary and preventive care visits per child for office sites and for total visits, including non-office sites. These results indicate that the implementation of PCCM was associated with lower primary care visits per child in total, and from office-based physicians in urban and rural Alabama communities. However, the phase-in of PCCM was positively associated with total and office-based preventive care visits per child in these Alabama communities. Since preventive visits were a subset of all primary care visits, this implies that the decline in the latter was composed of a decrease in visits for illness care in general, and to physician office sites.
Georgia. The results for Georgia based on the continuous measure of PCCM were largely not significant. As shown in Table 5 , the PCCM variable was insignificant for all measures of the office-based provider system, with the exception of office site volume and the participation rate in urban areas that was unexpectedly positive (p , .10). On the other hand, the utilization results (Table 6) suggest that the phase-in of PCCM in Georgia communities decreased the receipt of total primary care visits per child in urban communities even though there were increases at physician offices. In rural communities, there was evidence that both primary and preventive care visits per child increased, and that some of this increase was with office physicians.
Georgia-Differences in differences. The results of the differences-in-differences model for Georgia are shown in Table 7 . The coefficients shown in the 1994 column represent the effect of PCCM on the dependent measure in 1994. The coefficients shown in the subsequent years represent the sum of the interaction effect for the year and the initial PCCM coefficient. These coefficients are marked as statistically significant if the interaction is significant, indicating the effect of PCCM in the subsequent year is different from the effect in the first year. The findings indicate a more complex pattern across the period 1994-1997 not detected in the average effects shown in Table 5 . As noted, the advantage of this approach is that: 1) it uses those communities not yet phased into PCCM as ''controls'' instead of looking only at changes in one community over time; and 2) it allows us to test for changes in the effect of PCCM over the phase-in period.
These results show more statistically significant effects of PCCM on the Georgia provider system across communities. In rural Georgia, as in both rural and urban Alabama, the implementation of PCCM was associated with a significant decline in the Medicaid physician site participation rate and a decline in the average visit volume at physician sites. In urban Georgia, site participation rate per se was not affected. The number of physicians with small practices declined initially, and then increased in one of the three subsequent years. As seen in Table 5 , office visit volume initially rose in urban Georgia with PCCM implementation, but this increase in volume declined over the latter part of the implementation period. .310*** R 2 ¼ .85
Notes: Other control variables include: 1) presence of participating clinic in community; 2) median household income; 3) percentage black population; 4) Medicaid children in community; 5) primary care physicians per child in community; 6) Medicaid/private fee index; 7) percentage black 6 Medicaid/private fee index; and 8) year. * Significant at .10 level. ** Significant at .05 level. *** Significant at .01 level.
The results on utilization shown in Table 8 , also based on differences-in-differences analysis, show an initial increase in primary care office visits per enrollee in urban Georgia, with the increase declining over time, and a decrease in office visits per enrollee in rural Georgia, similar to that observed in both rural and urban Alabama. To all providers, preventive care use increased initially in urban Georgia, but then decreased over time, while increasing to office providers. Preventive visits to rural office providers also increased at the end of the implementation period. This suggests that, as in Alabama, declines in office-based primary care over time represented declines in illness-related visits to physicians, since preventive care visits increased.
Other Factors
We examined the impact of other market-level factors on physician site participation in Medicaid, on office visit volume, and on office visits per enrollee. We summarize those results here (full regression results are available upon request).
In rural Alabama and in rural and urban Georgia, the presence of a federally subsidized clinic was associated with lower office site participation rates, a smaller proportion of large physician sites, lower office visit volumes, and lower rates of primary care physician office visits per enrollee. On the other hand, presence of these clinics in a community was positively and significantly associated with both total primary and preventive care visits per enrollee in each state; the magnitude of these effects was larger in Alabama than Georgia.
This might suggest that clinics substitute for Medicaid office practices in the rural communities of our study states. However, given historical difficulties in attracting and retaining physicians to rural areas, many southern communities apply for and set up Federally Qualified Health Clinics (FQHCs) to complement their public hospital systems. Georgia, in particular, has a large number of rural hospitals and beds per capita as part of its safety net infrastructure for the state's rural poor. Alabama, on the other hand, has many more clinics, and the state saw significant growth in those clinics during our study period. Hence, this result may partly reflect, especially in Alabama, the endogeneity of clinics locating in rural areas where physician office sites historically have been limited. Similarly, in rural Alabama and in urban Georgia, markets with a higher proportion of blacks in the population had lower physician site participation rates. In urban Georgia, the Medicaid physician practices in areas with a larger black population were less likely to be small, and yet there were lower primary care office visit rates per Medicaid child enrollee in these communities. Controlling for the proportion of blacks in the population of the market area, both urban and rural Georgia communities in markets with proportionately more children on Medicaid had higher physician site participation rates and larger visit volumes per site, though the magnitude of the effects were small. In Alabama communities, these variables were not affected by the proportion of Medicaid-enrolled children in the market area.
As Tables 3 and 4 indicate, there was little variation in the relative level of Medicaid compared to private insurance reimbursements over the PCCM implementation period in Alabama.
This may have hampered our ability to test the effects of higher fees. In the Alabama results, higher fees had no effect on physician participation or enrollee care use, and actually were associated with lower physician visit volumes. Based on the multivariate analysis, higher Medicaid fees were more often positive in Georgia but largely insignificant. In regressions not shown here, higher relative fees were associated with higher participation, more limited sites, and more office visits per enrollee in high-black urban communities, indicating that their effect differs in areas with potential excess Medicaid demand (Held and Holahan 1985; Adams, 1995 Adams, , 2001 Mitchell 1991) . Given this association of higher fees with greater volume in these areas, had Georgia maintained relative fees over the study period the state's Medicaid children might not have experienced the level of decline in utilization seen in the descriptive data.
Discussion
Given the requirements placed on physicians with the implementation of PCCM, and our ex- pectation that they would prefer to limit their Medicaid practice size, we anticipated that PCCM implementation in Alabama and Georgia would be associated with reduced rates of physician site participation, reduced numbers of small Medicaid practices in communities, an increased proportion of Medicaid practices over the size threshold for large practices, and greater visit volumes at remaining participating physician sites. The results in Alabama and Georgia show some of our expected effects. PCCM was associated with a reduced proportion of local physicians providing a Medicaid office site in rural and urban communities in Alabama and in rural Georgia communities. There also were reductions in the number of small office sites in urban Georgia. However, where we had expected average physician practice sizes to increase and more practices to be larger-sized, office practice sizes generally decreased over the PCCM implementation period, with the exception of urban Georgia communities. This was reflected in Alabama communities by decreases in the proportion of large practices in communities and decreases in office volume; rural Georgia communities also saw PCCM-related declines in average office site volume.
These findings suggest that Medicaid-participating physicians in Alabama and Georgia responded to the implementation of PCCM, at least in the early years in the absence of reimbursement changes, by reducing and/or ending their participation in the programs. Independent of the effect of PCCM, physician office site participation in Medicaid was lower in communities with federally sponsored health clinics, and in urban Georgia and rural Alabama, it was lower in areas with a higher proportion of blacks in the population.
In rural and urban communities of Alabama and in rural Georgia, there were declines in the number of primary care office visits per child in the market area; in both states this was accompanied by an indication that preventive care began to constitute a larger proportion of total office visits. Utilization of primary care across all providers appeared to decline in Alabama and rural Georgia communities. Future studies with these data will examine the extent to which other sources of care increasingly substituted for officebased care as Medicaid physician participation diminished.
We note there are limitations to the analysis, especially with the Alabama data. Due to the concentrated period over which Alabama phased in PCCM, we were not able to use a differences-in-differences analysis. We also note that the unexpected negative sign on the fee index in the Alabama analysis, and its insignificance in most of the Georgia runs, may indicate its correlation with unmeasured characteristics of communities that negatively affect participation and service volume of providers. The lack of variation in the fee index also may have affected our ability to truly test its independent effect.
The present results are consistent, however, with discussions held in provider and family focus groups completed by Georgia Health Decisions, Inc., in each study state as part of our larger study. In Georgia, pediatricians and rural family practitioners reported that Medicaid (and SCHIP) children made up a substantial part of their practice; the physicians said that they did not limit them, while urban family practitioners said they did. Physicians generally said that random assignment of a primary care provider led to a process of confusion that many parents were not able to overcome. They also noted the lack of compliance (e.g., with recommended screening, followup visits) seen among Medicaid clientele. Georgia public health nurses who were interviewed expressed concern over disruptions in access, especially for preventive care; as noted, in late 1996, Georgia allowed for blanket authorization for public health providers. The decrease in preventive care with urban office physicians in the later periods of PCCM implementation may reflect this change in policy Alabama physicians also reported that Medicaid clients do not understand what it means to have an assigned doctor. Further, reassignment of their long-standing patients to other physician providers posed a problem. While education and information are lacking, the physicians felt that shifting patients to a PCCM system is a long-term process. Alabama public health providers also noted the impact of PCCM on their role; they reported varying degrees of success in contracting with private office-based physicians. The data suggest, however, that either there was enough success in doing this or that office-based participating physicians picked up this role because PCCM was associated with an increase in preventive visits per child in all areas of this state.
Taken together, the results indicate that the implementation of PCCM led to reductions in either office-based physician participation rates or the number of sites that, in turn, might have disrupted pre-existing relationships between such providers and Medicaid children. While the goal of ''mainstreaming'' Medicaid enrollees into private, office-based physician practices is not as paramount as maintaining overall access to primary care, the study states certainly envisioned an increased role of these types of providers as they implemented PCCM. Although both Alabama and Georgia have made efforts to improve the education of enrollees regarding the PCCM program-and Alabama recently has implemented physician fee increases-it is unclear whether these changes will stabilize or reverse the decline in office physician participation in the Medicaid programs. Our findings that the presence of clinics in a community increased both primary and preventive visits are reassuring, in that they suggest these non-office, safety-net providers continued their important mission as these states implemented PCCM.
Notes
An earlier version of this paper was presented at the Annual Research Meeting, Association for Health Services Research, June 2001. 1 A Passche index measures the relative prices paid in the two sectors using the following formula 
